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Implications of the
Smallv. United States Decision
Anwar K. Malik'
N the United States in 2004, over 449,000 victims of violent crimes re-
ported they were at the mercy of an assailant armed with a firearm, and
an estimated two-thirds of the 16,137 murders committed involved fire-
arms.2 The number of reported murders in Kentucky in 2oo4 rose from
I8I to 216 over the course of a single year, a staggering 19.3% increase. 3
Reported robberies similarly increased by 4.6%, and 46% of the Kentucky
robberies were committed with the aid of firearms.4 Although there are
twenty-two major federal gun crimes, 87% of all federal gun prosecutions
involved either of two crimes: use of a firearm to commit a violent or drug
crime or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. s
Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("GCA") 6 with the
broad purpose of keeping guns out of the hands of individuals who have
shown that "they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becom-
ing a threat to society."7 Based on their potential danger to the public, cer-
tain categories of individuals are prohibited, by federal law, from owning
firearms. Criminal convictions for serious crimes such as murder and rape
arguably provide a reliable basis for gauging the likelihood of committing
future crimes.' The GCA, in what is commonly known as the felon-in-pos-
I J.D. expected zoo7, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 BUREAU OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS AND CRIME STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
guns.htm.
3 KENTUCKY STATE POLICE, 2004 CRIME IN KENTUCKY 4, available at http://www.
kentuckystatepolice.orgpdf/crimefacts2oo4.pdf.
4 Id. at4, 10.
5 AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUND., THE ENFORCEMENT GAP: FEDERAL STRATEGY
NEGLECTS SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS 2 (2oo4), available at http://w3.agsfoundation.com (follow
"AGSF Reports" hyperlink; then follow "The Enforcement Gap" hyperlink; then follow
"Download in .pdf format" hyperlink).
6 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
7 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (I98O) (quoting Scarborough v. United States,
431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977)).
8 Studies suggest that a small number of criminals commit most serious crimes. See
generally William Claiborne, "Thee Strikes": Tough on Courts Too; Caifornia's Sentencing Law
Leads to Criminal Justice Logiam, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1995, at AI (Former California Secretary
of State Jones, sponsor of the "Three Strikes" law, estimates that seven percent of criminals
commit nearly two-thirds of serious crimes); Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law Shows It's Not as
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session statute, makes it a crime for felons and other individuals to own
guns.9 Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) provides that it is unlawful for a person
"who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year" to possess a firearm. ' °
A criminal arguably poses a "threat to society" regardless of where he
committed murder, rape, or some other serious crime. Most felonies under
federal or state law are also serious crimes in other nations. Over thirty-
three million foreign-born individuals live in the United States." People
continue to travel abroad in great numbers despite concerns over terrorism.
In 2004, international visitors to the United States totaled over forty-six
million, and there were over sixty-one million outbound U.S. residents.12
This Note focuses on whether immigrants, visitors to the United States,
and returning U.S. residents, whose criminal convictions occurred beyond
the territorial boundaries of the United States, ought to fall within the scope
of the GCA. In supporting the position of a majority of the circuit courts
and the dissenters in a recent Supreme Court case, Small v. United States,
Part I relies on the plain meaning of § 922(g)(I), statutory purpose, legisla-
tive history, canons of construction, and pragmatism to argue that foreign
convictions should count. Part II discusses issues that may arise from the
proposed new rule and holding of the Small case. Of particular importance
is the decision's potential effect on other statutes enacted with similar ex-
pansive language including certain provisions of the Patriot Act and the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Finally, Part III proposes solutions to the
problem of using foreign convictions as the basis for domestic prosecution.
Those who feel they were wrongly convicted in a foreign court can request
relief from the Secretary of the Treasury so they may lawfully possess a gun
in the United States. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States provides for judicial non-recognition of foreign judg-
ments.' 3 Adoption of the Restatement approach would provide additional
protection for the interests of defendants claiming they were wrongfully
convicted in a foreign court.
Simple as ItSeems, N.Y. IMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at Ai (Federal statistics show that "6 percent of
criminals commit about 70 percent of all crimes").
9 i8 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
Io Id. at § 922(g)(I).
I I U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
SUPPLEMENT i (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/foreign (follow
pp I-174" hyperlink; then follow "tab o3-oi .pdf." hyperlink.).
12 Office of Travel & Tourism Industries, http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2003-o5-ooIl/
index.html.




I. SCOPE OF THE FELON-IN-POSSESSION STATUTE DEFINED
Japanese police arrested Gary Sherwood Small ("Small"), a Pennsylvania
resident, when he smuggled a water heater filled with several firearms and
ammunition into Japan from the United States.' 4 In April 1994, a Japanese
court convicted Small of violating the Japanese Act Controlling the Posses-
sion of Firearms and Swords, the Gunpowder Control Act, and the Customs
Act.' 5 Each crime was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year. 6 The Japanese court returned a five-year sentence.' 7 Small was
subsequently released on parole in November 1996.18
Small left Japan for the United States upon termination of parole. In
June 1998, Small purchased a handgun from a Pennsylvania dealer and
filled out a form supplied by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives. '9 He did not disclose the Japanese conviction when asked the
following question: "Have you ever been convicted in any court of a crime
for which the judge could have imprisoned you for more than one year,
even if the judge actually gave you a shorter sentence?.20
After a background check by the government led to discovery of the
Japanese conviction, police searched Small's apartment and found another
handgun and 335 rounds of ammunition.21 The government brought crimi-
nal charges against Small for unlawful possession of a firearm by a person
who has a prior conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I). 2
A. Procedural History
Small was indicted on four counts: one count of making a false statement
to a federally licensed firearms dealer, one count of possession of ammu-
nition by a convicted felon, and two counts of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon.23 Small urged dismissal of the indictment because his
Japanese conviction was beyond the scope of § 922(g)(I),24 but the motion
14 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 395 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15 United States v. Small, 333 F3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. zoo3), rev'd, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
16 Id. at 426.
17 Small, 544 U.S. at 387.
18 Id. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19 See Brief of United States at 3, United States v. Small, 544 U.S. 385, No. 03-750,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/oo3/oresponsesloo3-o75o.resp.pdf [hereinafter
Brief].
20 Id. at 3-4.
21 Id. at 4.
22 Id. at 4.
23 United States v. Small, 183 E Supp. 2d 755, 756-757 (D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 333 E3d 425
(3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
24 See generally id.
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was denied. s Subsequently, Small conditionally pled guilty.26 The Federal
District Court concluded that the phrase "convicted in any court" included
foreign convictions,7 and the Court of Appeals for the Third District af-
firmed."5 Both courts agreed that the statute encompasses foreign judg-
ments and that the Japanese judicial proceedings were fair.29 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to tackle the issue of whether "any court" includes
foreign courts.
B. The Decision
The controversial Small decision on April 26, 2005 settled a then-exist-
ing circuit split among the lower federal courts. A majority of the circuits
agreed that foreign convictions should serve as predicate offenses. The
Third,30 Fourth,3' and Sixth32 Circuits concluded that foreign convictions
count for purposes of I8 U.S.C. § 922. The Second33 and Tenth34 Circuits
took the contrary position. The Small Court, in a 5 to 3 opinion delivered
by Justice Breyer, sided with the Second and Tenth Circuits and held that
"convicted in any court" refers to only domestic convictions. 35
25 Id. at 770. Small did not challenge his conviction or the constitutionality of § 922(g)(i)
on Second Amendment grounds. Therefore, the Small opinion does not mention the Second
Amendment. This raises a difficult constitutional question the Court may eventually have to
tackle: Can a foreign court's judgment limit a citizen's "right to keep and bear arms"? Even
the ability of a domestic conviction to make a criminal's gun ownership unlawful is contro-
versial. Pro-gun organizations oppose incremental restrictions on gun rights based on the fear
that Congress, if unrestrained, may eventually strip their rights, as law-abiding citizens, to
own guns. Vehement opposition to recent legislation such as the Brady Law supports such a
notion.
26 United States v. Small, 333 E3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 2003).
27 See Brief, supra note 19, at 4.
z8 See Small, 333 E3d at 426.
29 Id. at 427-28.
30 In adopting the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 482, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that foreign convictions should be
recognized, but with procedural safeguards to ensure foreign convictions comply with our
notions of fundamental fairness. See Small, 333 E3d at 428.
31 See United States v. Atkins, 872 F.d 94 (4th Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the Winson court
on the inapplicability of the rule of lenity because the statute is unambiguous), overrled by
Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
32 See United States v. Winson, 793 F.zd 754 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding the statutory language
unambiguous), overruled by Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (zoo5).
33 See United States v. Gayle, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26673 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying on
legislative history including the Senate Report and the Conference Report).
34 See United States v. Concha, 233 E3d 1249 (ioth Cit. 2000) (invoking the rule of lenity
to hold that foreign convictions do not count).
35 Small, 544 U.S. at 386. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist was undergoing treatment for
thyroid cancer and did not participate; see generally Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit Gun Law




The majority, in refusing a literal reading of § 922(g)(1), relied on its be-
lief that the statutory text is ambiguous in light of congressional silence,
stressed that foreign judgments are not as reliable as domestic convictions,
and asserted that a literal reading would lead to anomalies.
36
The dissenters, led by Justice Thomas, argued for a literal reading of
the statute.37 Justice Thomas emphasized the plain meaning of the text,
the majority's misuse of canons of construction, and legislative history, in
particular an amendment to the Senate bill that eliminated limiting lan-
guage in favor of expansive text.
3
i. TextualAnalysis. -The Court began by looking to the plain meaning of
the statute. 39 Section 922(g)(I) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person ... who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to possess in or affecting
commerce any firearm or ammunition. " 4° Unless ambiguous or absurd, the
plain words of a statute should be given effect.4' The majority determined
that the presence of the word "any" is insufficient in itself to reach a con-
clusion42 despite the fact the Court has previously given "any" an expan-
sive meaning. 43 Contrary to Justice Breyer's reasoning, the Fourth Circuit
has indicated that "'[any' is hardly an ambiguous term, being all-inclusive
in nature." 44
On the same day Small was decided, the Pasquantino majority, in an
opinion written by Justice Thomas, held that a plot to defraud aforeign gov-
ernment of tax revenues falls within the scope of a statute prohibiting the
use of interstate wires for "any scheme or artifice to defraud." 45 Pasquan-
tino, like Small, involved aspects of international law. The Pasquantino
defendants smuggled liquor into Canada to evade import taxes and were
prosecuted under the federal wire fraud statute.46 At issue was "whether a
scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the wire
36 See Small, 544 U.S. at 386-94.
37 Id. at 1759-6o (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 1759-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 1754.
40 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-(9).
41 See generally Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (19I7) (plain meaning
rule).
42 Small, 544 U.S. at 388-89.
43 See United States v. Gonzales, 5zo U.S. 1, 5(1997).
44 United States v. Atkins, 872 F.zd 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989).
45 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354-59 (2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343)
(emphasis added).
46 Id. at 353.
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fraud statute."47 The defendants argued they had not committed wire fraud
within the meaning of the statute because the government was effective-
ly attempting to enforce the revenue laws of Canada. 4s Nevertheless, the
Court found the defendants' conduct to be within the scope of the act and
upheld prosecution of Pasquantino for violation of foreign tax law.
49 It is
difficult to reconcile the Small and Pasquantino decisions given that the
Court effectively accepted an expansive interpretation of the words of the
wire fraud statute but refused to give a similar reading to § 922(g)(I).
One might wonder why Congress chose "convicted in any court" in-
stead of a phrase that more accurately represents Justice Breyer's statu-
tory interpretation, such as "convicted in any domestic court" or "convicted
in any state or federal court." Legislative history indicates that Congress
considered alternate language. As passed by Congress, § 922(g)(I) makes
no reference to "Federal" or "State" crimes.5° Before being amended, the
Senate bill specified "Federal" crimes punishable by more than one year
of imprisonment and "crimes determined by the laws of a State to be a
felony."5' Justice Breyer's argument that Congress made the changes to
"avoid[] potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may define
the term 'felony' differently"52 is unconvincing because "convicted in any
state or federal court" is a better choice to serve that purpose.5 3
The majority's argument is further weakened by the fact that Congress
chose specific language in enacting other sections of the statute:
The term 'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year' does not include--(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to an-
titrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar
offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or (B) any State of-
fense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable
by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.s4
Congress presumably desires textual uniformity in the GCA. For exam-
ple, readers of the GCA should be able to read the statutory definition
for a term and locate this term in any two provisions knowing the two in-
stances of such term have the same meaning unless specified otherwise.
47 Id. at 354-
48 Id. at 354-54.
49 Id. at 372.
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 92z(g)(1) (2003) ("convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year").
51 Small, 544 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 393.
53 Id. at 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54 18 U.S.C. § 92 (a)(20) (emphasis added); see also t8 U.S.C. § 92 (a)(33)(A)(i) ("[Tlhe
term 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' means an offense that-(i) is a misdemeanor
under Federal, State, or Tribal law").
[Vol. 94
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Yet section 922(g)(I) makes no reference to "Federal" or "State" crimes
since, presumably, Congress did not intend to limit the statutory scope to
domestic courts. Because the text is unambiguous and Congress chose an
expansive meaning in enacting § 922(g)(I), the literal meaning should be
given effect. A casual reading of the words suggests it should be unlawful
for Small to possess a firearm in the United States.
2. Canons of Construction. -Perhaps finding inadequate support for its po-
sition in existing doctrines,5 the majority "first invents a canon of statutory
interpretation-what it terms 'an ordinary assumption about the reach of
domestically oriented statutes."'' 6 As Justice Thomas describes, "This new
'assumption' imposes a clear statement rule on Congress: Absent a clear
statement, a statute refers to nothing outside the United States."s7 The new
rule is similar to, but broader than, the doctrine against extraterritoriality.58
The doctrine against extraterritoriality reflects a rule of construction that
restricts a statute from applying abroad unless Congress intended for it to
do so.59 A court should restrict the statute from reaching conduct occurring
abroad if Congress is silent on whether the statutory scope extends beyond
the territorial boundaries of the United States.6° The doctrinal purpose is
to diminish clashes between United States and foreign laws.6I However,
because § 922(g)(I) does not criminalize gun possession in countries other
than the United States, the facts of this case do not implicate the doctrine
against extraterritoriality.
62
Justice Breyer recognizes the inapplicability of this doctrine and creates
a new assumption.63 Its application requires that a statute be "domestically
oriented." If the court determines that a statute is "domestically oriented"
and the "statutory language, context, history, or purpose" 64 does not sug-
gest otherwise, then the statute should be restricted from reaching conduct
outside the United States. The "ordinary assumption about the reach of
55 Small, 544 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also notes, "Aside from
the extraterritoriality canon, which the Court properly concedes does not apply, I know of no
principle of statutory construction justifying the result the Court reaches." Id.
56 Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 390 (majority opinion)).
57 Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority opinion denied that it created a clear
statement rule. Id. at 390.
58 See infra notes 98-1o4 and accompanying text.




62 Small, 544 U.S. at 389 ("That presumption would apply... were we to consider whether
this statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad as well as domestically.").
63 Id.
64 Id. at 390-91.
2oo5-2oo6]
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domestically oriented statutes" is broader than the doctrine against extra-
territoriality because it does not matter if the conduct occurs overseas or in
the United States. 65 For example, the Small decision restricted the statute
from reaching felonious possession of a firearm occurring in Pennsylvania
under its new rule.66 Unfortunately, the Court has offered few clues on how
to determine whether a statute is "domestically oriented" or how to apply
the rule; the issue is ambiguous throughout the Court's jurisprudence. 67
The implications of the Court's new rule are more thoroughly discussed
below in Part III.
Second, the majority asserts that there would be "anomalies" unless the
statute excludes foreign convictions. 6s If foreign convictions counted, for-
eign and domestic offenders would be treated differently under certain ex-
ceptions-the statute would treat domestic offenders more leniently than
foreign offenders in some situations,6 but in other situations, such as a mis-
demeanor domestic violence offense, the domestic offender would receive
harsher treatment. 70 Justice Breyer's rationale suggests that had Congress
thought about foreign judgments, it would have provided across-the-board
exceptions and not exceptions limited to merely domestic convictions.7'
The Court, in invoking the canon against absurdities, reasons that such
distinctions would be "senseless."
72
The canon against absurdities is a rule of statutory construction whereby
a court can reject the plain language of a statute to avoid "patently absurd
consequences." 73 This canon is not to be liberally applied; its application
demands extraordinary circumstances.74 The issue here is whether differ-
65 See generally Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66 See id. at 1754, 1758.
67 See, e.g., Pasquanfino, 544 U.S. 349,371-72- ("[T]he wire fraud statute punishes frauds
executed 'in interstate or foreign commerce,' so this is surely not a statute in which Congress
had only 'domestic concerns in mind."') (internal citations omitted). However, this reasoning
is difficult to reconcile with the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) which makes it unlaw-
ful for certain persons "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Like the wire
fraud statute, it seems Congress did not have only "domestic concerns in mind" in enacting
18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
68 Small, 544 U.S. at 391.
69 Id. at 403 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A domestic antitrust or business regulatory of-
fender could possess a gun, while a similar foreign offender could not; the perpetrator of a
state misdemeanor punishable by two years or less in prison could possess a gun, while an
analogous foreign offender could not.").
70 Id. at 403-04 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 391.
72 Id.
73 United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. I8, 27 (1948).
74 "This exception remains a legitimate tool of the Judiciary, however, only as long as
the Court acts with self-discipline by limiting the exception to situations where the result of
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ing levels of treatment for foreign and domestic offenders is reasonably jus-
tified-if extremely unreasonable, the plain text arguably leads to absurd
results and the statute should not be read literally.75 Thomas, in dissent,
argues against application of the canon against absurdities:
[Tlhe majority's interpretation permits those convicted overseas of mur-
der, rape, assault, kidnapping, terrorism, and other dangerous crimes to pos-
sess firearms freely in the United States. Meanwhile, a person convicted
domestically of tampering with a vehicle identification number, 18 U.S.C.
§ 51 i(a)(i), is barred from possessing firearms. The majority's concern with
anomalies provides no principled basis for choosing its interpretation of the
statute over mine.
76
A literal interpretation of the statutory text does not lead to the patently
absurd consequences required for application of the exception. 77 Congress
might have carved out certain exceptions to favor domestic offenders over
foreign offenders for practical reasons. Thomas provides an example: "[Ilt
is not senseless to bar a Canadian antitrust offender from possessing a gun
in this country, while exempting a domestic antitrust offender from the
ban. Congress might have decided to proceed incrementally and exempt
only antitrust offenses with which it was familiar, namely, domestic ones."
s
If there is some reasonable justification for a literal reading, it seems pru-
dent to bar application of the canon against absurdities and adhere to the
text of the statute as enacted by Congress.
3. Congressional Purpose. -The purpose of the GCA is to keep guns out of
the hands of individuals who have proved themselves dangerous to soci-
ety.79 The difficulty is identifying who is dangerous. To determine whether
a person or class of persons poses danger, one might reasonably inquire
about criminal history, felonious or otherwise.
A person with a history of misdemeanor violence convictions might be
more likely to commit a gun crime than many felons. Of particular concern
are misdemeanor crimes involving family violence. Not every convicted
applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impos-
sible that Congress could have intended the result, and where the alleged absurdity is so clear
as to be obvious to most anyone." Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. z81, 289 (1989) ("[L]iteral application of a directive might be senseless or contrary to its
obvious purpose. For example, virtually no one doubts the correctness of the ancient decision
that a statute prohibiting 'letting blood in the streets' did not ban emergency surgery.") (citing
KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. z81, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)).
76 Small, 544 U.S. at 405 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
77 Id. at 403-04.
78 See id. at 404.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
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felon will be prone to committing an act of physical violence, and the GCA
has carved out exceptions so that certain categories of felons can lawfully
own a gun.
8"
Even within the category of violent offenders, there is hope that those
convicted of serious crimes will no longer face temptation to commit more
crimes in the future. One goal of the criminal justice system is to rehabili-
tate those who break the law. People can reform, and a reformed man should
have the right to own a gun for self-defense. It follows that prohibition on
gun ownership, unfortunately, sometimes keeps guns out of the hands of
those who are not a danger to society. Many gun rights supporters do not
oppose the felon-in-possession statute despite these minor drawbacks.,,
But sometimes convicted felons do not reform. Punishment for the
violent crime alone may not be enough to deter further criminal conduct
by the felon. A criminal knows he will be serving a long sentence if con-
victed of murder or some other serious crime. The problem is the criminal
typically does not believe he will be caught--else he would take additional
measures to cover up evidence of the act or abandon the act altogether.
It follows that § 922(g)(I) is a necessary prophylactic to deter violent
crime when the threat of punishment for the violent crime offers minimal
deterrence.
A foreign court may provide lesser, or sometimes greater, protection for
individual rights than a domestic court.12 Acts criminalized under a foreign
legal system might be legal, or perhaps even encouraged, here.8 3 A particu-
lar criminal act may carry a more severe punishment abroad than here. For
example, Japan is known for its strict gun laws.1 For these reasons, Breyer
concludes that a foreign conviction "somewhat less reliably identifies dan-
gerous individuals" than a domestic conviction.5
Despite the differences, foreign convictions arguably indicate danger-
ousness just as reliably as domestic convictions.' A resident or traveler to a
foreign nation ought to obey the laws of that nation. If foreign convictions
8o See supra note 69.
81 See http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FAQs/Default.aspx?Section=21 ("Today, NRA con-
tinues to lead the call for expansion of 'Project Exile,' a federal program that throws the book
at felons who illegally possess firearms.").
82 See Small, 544 U.S. at 389-9 o .
83 Id. (citing, for example, Art. 153 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, in Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure 171 which criminalizes "Private
Entrepreneurial Activity.").
84 See http://www.nraila.orgllssues/FactSheetsRead.aspx?ID=78 ("In Japan, rifles and
handguns are prohibited; shotguns are very strictly regulated. Japan's Olympic shooters have
had to practice out of the country because of their country's gun laws.")
85 Small, 544 U.S. at 390.
86 See id. at 402 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority "ignores countless




counted under i8 U.S.C. § 922, it is inevitable and unfortunate that a per-
son convicted overseas would be prohibited from owning a gun here de-
spite posing no danger to society. The GCA is not a perfect solution to gun
control, but the reality is that there is no way to predict the future to find
out if someone will commit a violent crime. It is reasonable that Congress,
in its choice of expansive language not found in many other sections of the
GCA,8 7 recognized that foreign convictions can provide a reliable means of
measuring dangerous to society.
4. Legislative History. -In support of the ordinary assumption about the
reach of domestically oriented statutes,88 the majority relies on legislative
silence as to whether the statute applies to foreign convictions s9 First,
Breyer reasons that Congress probably did not consider foreign convic-
tions because it is a rare occurrence that a felon will be prosecuted un-
der § 922(g)(i) on the basis of a foreign conviction.90 The strength of this
argument is significantly weakened by an October 2004 report from the
Americans for Gun Safety Foundation which found that the government
simply chooses not to prosecute most gun crimes. 9' Two of the twenty-two
major gun crimes made up eighty-seven percent of federal prosecutions in
2003.92 It is also possible that federal prosecutors focused their efforts on
possession charges against felons convicted in the United States instead of
bringing charges against those with prior overseas convictions. The then-
existing circuit split might have discouraged prosecutors from bringing
charges against felons like Small. The point is that the government should
be prosecuting many of those gun crimes. Second, Breyer fails to mention
that the GCA was passed in a hurry in response to several high-profile as-
sassinations which arguably explains the sparse legislative history.93
Thomas argues that the Court incorrectly relies on legislative silence
because Congress in fact was not silent.94 The Senate bill included narrow
language such as "State," "Federal," and "felony" before being amended
87 See, e.g., supra note 54.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
89 Small, 544 U.S. at 394.
90 Id.
9i AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUND., THE ENFORCEMENT GAP: FEDERAL STRATEGY
NEGLECTS SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS 2 (2004), available at http://w3.agsfoundation.com/media/
AGS-enf.pdf.
92 See supra text accompanying note 5.
93 Christine A. Vogelei, The Fundamental (Un)Fairness of Foreign Convictions as Predicate
Felonies, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REV. I317, 1321 (2005) (suggesting that the sparse legislative history
can be attributed to "Congress hurriedly pass[ing] the Safe Streets Act" in response to the
assassinations of President John E Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert
Kennedy).
94 Small, 544 U.S. at 406-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2005-2006]
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to include the broad language "in any court." 95 Was Congress truly silent?
Sometimes actions speak louder than words. The change from narrow to
broad language supports the contention that Congress wanted to give the
statute an expansive meaning, or else Congress would have preserved the
original language or used alternate wording such as "convicted in any Fed-
eral or State court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceed-
ing one year."96
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
Prosecutions under § 922(g)(I) for foreign convictions do not occur fre-
quently: there were only five courts of appeals and three district court
opinions prior to the Small decision. 97 Perhaps infrequent prosecution can
be explained by the government's reluctance to prosecute rather than an
insignificant number of foreign convicted gun owners. Despite the rarity of
prosecution, the decision has far reaching effects because of the creation of
an unprecedented rule and the frequency with which similar "in any court"
language appears in other recently-enacted statutes.
A. Assumption about the Reach of Domestically Oriented Statutes
The majority creates an assumption about the reach of domestically ori-
ented statutes. 98 A statute "applies domestically, not extraterritorially" un-
less "statutory language, context, history, or purpose" suggest otherwise. 99
Breyer justifies the new rule by analogizing the rule to the doctrine against
extraterritoriality which attempts to restrict federal statutes "from reaching
conduct beyond U.S. borders" when Congress is silent.-°°
The key to understanding the difference between the two doctrines
is figuring out where the conduct in controversy occurred. In Small, the
95 Id. at 397-98, 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes
50-53.
96 Id. at 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97 Brief, supra note 19, at I i.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
99 Small, 544 U.S. at 390-91.
Ioo Small, 544 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To apply the canon of construction, a
court should look at the statutory text to see whether Congress' purpose was to extend cover-
age of the statute beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). The doctrine against extraterritorial application of federal
statutes would have been applicable had the statute attempted to criminalize gun possession
abroad. Small, 544 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Neither does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I)
attempt to enforce foreign law. If foreign convictions counted, prosecution under § 922(g)(1)
would still punish domestic conduct, the unlawful possession of a firearm. The statute would
take foreign judgments as it finds them.
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alleged criminal conduct, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, hap-
pened in Pennsylvania. '°' On the other hand, the government was not try-
ing to bring charges against Small for smuggling firearms, conduct that took
place in Japan.
2
If the possession had occurred outside the United States in the face of
Congressional silence then it is likely that the doctrine against extrater-
ritoriality is applicable to restrict the reach of the statute. For the majori-
ty's new rule, it does not matter if the unlawful conduct occurs within the
United States or if it happens on foreign soil.103 Breyer draws a bright line
between "domestically oriented statutes" and those that are not and hastily
lumps 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) into the "domestically oriented" category."'4
The obvious implication of the new rule is that Congress must clearly
express its intent to encompass foreign matters if it wants a statute to refer
to international law. Expansive language on its own, such as "in any court,"
is insufficient after the Small holding. Breyer hints that foreign convictions
are relevant for statutes dealing with terrorism or immigration.'05 However,
a statute may blur the line between purely domestic and international in
scope. The majority's bright line rule is of little practical use unless courts
know how to apply it. The problem is that the majority provides few guide-
lines regarding what is sufficient to keep a statute out of the "domestically
oriented" category.' °0 In the absence of further guidance from the Court,
the meaning of statutes with similar wording remains unclear.
B. The Patriot Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act
This statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, is not the only one with "convicted in any
court" language. The Small decision may affect certain sections of the Pa-
triot Act'07 and the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INX').' 8
The Small decision affects immigration law, as the INA definition of
"aggravated felony" includes a § 922(g)(I) offense.'09 Aggravated felonies
provide one criminal ground for the deportation of aliens."1° Many types of
crimes are aggravated felonies under the INA, and aliens can be banished
for even trivial crimes:
io' Small, 544 U.S. at 387.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 389-9o.
104 See supra note 67.
105 Small, 544 U.S. at 391.
io6 Id. at 399--401.
107 See Brief, supra note 19, at 12 & n.7.
io8 8 U.S.C. § i ioi(a)(43)(E)(ii) (2ooo); 8 U.S.C. § 12z7(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2ooo).
io9 8 U.S.C. § i loi(a)(43)(E)(ii).
iio 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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In 1989 [Xuan Wilson] was convicted of writing a forged check for $19.83.
Because of this minor infraction, Ms. Wilson will be deported to a country
she has not seen for almost three decades and will be permanently barred
from returning to the United States. This situation is only one example of
the many severe consequences of current U.S. immigration law. Under cur-
rent law, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States can be
banished from the country for an offense as minor as writing a bad check,
shop-lifting, or misdemeanor battery.'I
If "writing a bad check, shop-lifting, or misdemeanor battery," assuming
the offense occurred in the United States, are grounds for banishment un-
der the INA, it is not unreasonable to deport an alien for a foreign convic-
tion of serious magnitude.
The Biological Weapons Statute as amended by the Patriot Act prohib-
its the possession of biological weapons by a "restricted person" who "has
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding 1 year."" 2 Another section of the Patriot Act, the explosives
statute, makes it unlawful to knowingly distribute explosives to anyone
who "has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year"1 3 The provision similarly prohibits
shipping, transporting, and possessing explosives by this restricted class.'
4
It seems intuitive that Congress intended the Biological Weapons Stat-
ute and the explosives statute to count foreign convictions. The purpose of
the Patriot Act is to combat terrorism, and foreign convictions are arguably
relevant to the war on terror. These statutes might pass muster under the
assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes. The Small
majority hints that statutes dealing with immigration and terrorism are
less likely to be "domestically oriented" than statutes involving other sub-
ject matter." s The Court, however, has previously stated that the doctrine
against extraterritoriality, which is similar to the Small rule, "has special
force" when a statute "involve[s] foreign and military affairs." " 6 It remains
to be seen whether Congress will eliminate all doubt as to the scope of
these statutes by amending them to explicitly provide for extraterritorial
application.
I I i Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293,
293-94 (2003).
I I8 U.S.C. § 175b(d)(2)(B) (zooo), added by Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 1O7-56, Title VIII, § 817(2), 115 Stat. 386 (Oct. 26, zooI).
113 18 U.S.C. § 842(d)(2).
114 18 U.S.C. § 842(i)(1).
I 15 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390 (2005).




Balancing the constitutional right to bear arms against public safety is not
an easy task. On one hand, citizens ought to be able to defend themselves,
and guns are necessary for self-defense. There exists a concern that indi-
vidual rights are gradually being chipped away each time a new piece of
gun regulation is passed.
On the other hand, unrestricted gun ownership is no longer practical,
and Congress, in enacting the GCA, recognized the urgency of regulating
gun ownership to protect the public. In 1968, the concern was with high-
profile assassinations. ' 7 In 2005, society continues to struggle with gun
violence. School shootings, domestic and international terrorism, and ev-
eryday incidents of domestic violence serve as reminders that guns should
be kept away from those unable to use them responsibly.
Even the National Rifle Association does not oppose the felon-in-pos-
session statute."8 It makes sense that those convicted of serious crimes,
especially violent acts such as murder, have proven unable to own a gun
without posing a threat to society. The obstacle to giving the felon-in-pos-
session statute a literal interpretation is the Court's reluctance to accept
that American courts are well-prepared to recognize the decisions of for-
eign courts.
Globalization is bringing the world closer together. As a result, the con-
cern for international law is more prevalent now than ever before. Glo-
balization has led to many economic benefits such as "increased trade,
increased flows of information and capital, increased foreign investment,
and increased mobility of labor and the means of production."" 9 With the
good comes the bad: "Globalization is bringing ideas, cultures and lifestyles
into contact-and sometimes conflict-with one another in new and un-
usual ways.'"' 1 ° American courts should embrace globalization by recogniz-
ing foreign convictions; an interpretation of the felon-in-possession statute
that considers foreign convictions would help to keep firearms out of the
hands of people likely to commit gun crime.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against a literal reading of §
922(g)(I) is that Congress can amend the statute if it wants to count for-
eign convictions as predicate offenses for felon-in-possession prosecution.
That is, "convicted in any court" could be rephrased to give extraterritorial
effect, and there would be no dispute as to Congressional intent. The jus-
tification for demanding Congressional action is that the judiciary should




12o Gert Weisskirchen & George Voinovich, Halting the New Hatred, WASH. PosT, April
28, 2004, at Az i.
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avoid legislating from the bench. However, there are mechanisms already
in place to support the feasibility of using foreign convictions as predicate
offenses, such as requesting relief from the Secretary of the Treasury.
A. Discretionary Relief
Congress provided a method of obtaining relief from the disabilities im-
posed by § 922(g)(I). Prior to 1992, relief was available to domestic felons
and presumably also to those convicted abroad.' A person convicted of a
serious crime in a foreign court could clear his or her status before attempt-
ing to purchase a firearm in the U.S."- Unfortunately, Congress has denied
funding for this purpose since 1992.123
Eighteen U.S.C. § 925(c) provides that one can request relief from the
Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary may restore gun privileges to an
applicant if "the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety" and "the granting of the relief would not be contrary to
the public interest."124 Judicial review is available if the applicant feels the
Secretary wrongly denied relief."12
In the event Congress lifts its bar on funding, § 925(c) would allevi-
ate many of the problems regarding counting foreign convictions that con-
cerned the Small majority.X26 Although relief does not turn on the validity
of the foreign conviction, the Secretary is to consider "the circumstances
regarding the conviction and the applicant's record and reputation." 127 The
grounds for providing relief seem more persuasive when a foreign convic-
tion is highly offensive to domestic notions of fairness as illustrated by the
following:
A licensed firearms dealer, Thomas Bean, drove from the gun show he was
working in Texas across the border to Mexico for dinner. He inadvertently
left a box of ammunition in his car, and when the Mexican border agents
discovered it, they immediately arrested him. After Bean signed a confes-
sion written in Spanish, a language he did not understand, without assis-
121 A gun dealer was convicted in a Mexican court for importing ammunition into
Mexico. He applied for relief, but his application was returned unprocessed because Congress
had cut off funding for this purpose. Presumably there would have been an investigation in
the absence of a congressional bar on funding for relief from firearm disabilities. United States
v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (zooz).
122 See generally i8 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).
123 Bean, 537 U.S. at 74.
i24 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
125 See Bradley v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 736 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir.
1984); Kitchens v. Dep't of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 535 Fzd
1197 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Winson, 793 Fd 754, 758 (6th Cir. 1986).




tance of counsel, a Mexican court sentenced him to five years in prison.
Public outcry over the severity of Bean's punishment spurred the Mexican
government to quickly reclassify the offense as a misdemeanor. Due to the
conviction, however, Bean could no longer continue his livelihood as a gun
dealer because of his status as a felon under the Safe Streets Act.1zs
Despite the persuasive facts surrounding the Bean case, an applicant's
subjective perception of how he was treated by a foreign court might prove
unconvincing to the Secretary unless the applicant has some physical evi-
dence to back up his claim.
One disadvantage of discretionary relief is that it can be difficult for the
applicant to show "the circumstances regarding the conviction" given that
he likely will not have access to the foreign court documents and, even if
he gets the documents, they probably will be in a foreign language. The
documents might leave off evidence the applicant needs to argue his po-
sition. It seems unlikely the Secretary will be persuaded to grant relief
without evidence from official court documents. For these reasons it seems
unlikely that the ability to request relief from the Secretary is sufficient in
itself to justify recognition of foreign decisions, but its availability might be
of use to an applicant convicted in a court of similar jurisprudence as our
own, such as an English court.
B. Judicial Non-Recognition
A reasonable judicial solution might be a case-by-case evaluation of foreign
judgments. A domestic court could recognize some decisions but refuse to
recognize other decisions. A court could conceivably examine the circum-
stances surrounding a foreign conviction to determine whether it should
count for purposes of § 922(g)(I). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States ("Restatement") provides guidance with
two grounds that mandate non-recognition and six discretionary grounds
that provide for selective non-recognition of foreign decisions. 29 The con-
sequence of non-recognition is typically making the foreign judgment in-
admissible as evidence in a domestic court.'
°3
The Restatement approach provides that a domestic court may not rec-
ognize a foreign judgment when: (i) "the judgment was rendered under a
judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures com-
patible with due process of law,"'' or (z) the foreign court "did not have
128 See Volegei, supra note 93, at 1318-19 (2005) (citing Bean v. United States, 89 F Supp.
2d 828, 829 (E.D. Tex. zooo)).
129 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
130 Id. at § 482, cmt. i.
131 Id. at § 482. Christine Aubin proposes a case-by-case analysis under a two-prong test:
"Would the offense be considered a felony under the laws of the United States?" and "Does
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jurisdiction over the defendant." '32 In addition, the Restatement gives do-
mestic courts the discretion to refuse recognition of foreign decisions. Rel-
evant factors include a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, insufficiency of
notice to the defendant, fraud, and public policy considerations. '33
The advantage of the Restatement approach is that it furthers the Con-
gressional purpose of keeping guns out of the hands of those who cannot
be trusted 34 while simultaneously providing procedural safeguards against
counting offensive foreign judgments. It allows dubious decisions to be
ignored for purposes of § 922(g)(i) and related provisions. In sum, adop-
tion of the Restatement could offer a reasonably fair process for reformed
felons.
One disadvantage of selective recognition of foreign judgments is that
it requires a case-by-case analysis, which is more difficult than taking for-
eign judgments "as is." Evidence contained in foreign court documents
could be highly relevant to the analysis. The foreign court might refuse to
comply with a request for production of the documents. If the documents
are handed over, the text may be in a foreign language. Many American
judges might be ill-prepared to tackle such rulings. These factors burden a
court attempting to apply the Restatement approach. A second disadvan-
tage is that case-by-case analysis goes against the plain text of the statute.
35
Congress supplied exceptions to § 922(g)(I),'36 yet nowhere is it mentioned
that some foreign judgments should count, but others should not.
Although the Restatement is not binding authority, it is a highly per-
suasive approach of how courts ought to treat international law. Overall, the
Restatement approach provides effective safeguards for those convicted in
foreign courts at the cost of burdening both the judiciary and the felon.
IV. CONCLUSION
International law raises challenging issues: First, should the government
punish a criminal based on a foreign judgment? Second, should the degree
to which the foreign judicial system differs from ours matter? There are no
easy solutions. Balancing all the competing interests is no simple task.
Concededly, many foreign judicial systems do not protect individual
rights in the same manner as ours. Foreign courts might not provide for
this nation/country adhere to similar due process standards and requirements as the United
States?" Christine Aubin, Case Comment: United States v. Gayle, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 847,
854-57 (2004).
132 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
133 Id.
134 See Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
136 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 403 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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due process, the right to counsel, or other notable principles of American
jurisprudence:'
The new Palestinian judicial system also suffers from due process and oth-
er basic constitutional protection problems. For example, in Gaza and the
West Bank, many individuals are incarcerated for a significant period of time
without receiving legal counsel. Moreover, oftentimes individuals accused
are not informed of their right to counsel. Police officers involved may delay
advising the accused of their rights until after the prosecutor interrogates
the accused and takes a statement. Considering these violations of basic
due process, it can hardly be said that persons charged under Palestinian law
are tried fairly according to U.S. standards of justice.1
7
Although foreign criminal justice systems may provide protections that
fall short of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,
we must not let pride in our judicial system rise to the level of arrogance.
First, on average, it cannot be said that foreign courts offend the traditional
notions of fairness-much of American law originated from the common
law of England.38 Second, the Winson court could "perceive no reason why
the commission of serious crimes elsewhere in the world is likely to make
the person so convicted less dangerous than he whose crimes were commit-
ted within the United States." ,39
For those isolated convictions where there was a substantialdeprivation
of basic rights, there are at least two readily-available solutions: (i) relief
from the Secretary of the Treasury should Congress appropriate funds and
(2) judicial non-recognition under the Restatement approach. Collectively
these two solutions are sufficient to protect individual rights if foreign judg-
ments are honored while simultaneously guarding society against danger.
137 Aron J. Estaver, Dangerous Criminals or Dangerous Courts: Foreign Felonies as Predicate
Offenses Under Section 922(g)(I) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 38 VAND. J. "tANSNAT'L L. 215,
240 (2005).
138 United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Atkins suffered the mis-
fortune of violating foreign law in England, the country which provides the origin or ante-
cedent of the jurisdictional system employed in the United States of America. We here deal
with a system of common law and statutes refining it which obtains in England and America
alike.").
139 United States v. Winson, 793 F2d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 1986).
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